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The Prospects for a Democratic Presidency in a Post-9/11 World

[W]hen I won [the] election in 2008, one of the reasons I think
that people were excited about the campaign was the prospect that
we would change how business is done in Washington. And we
were in such a hurry to get things done that we didn’t change how
things got done. And I think that frustrated people.
– President Barack Obama1

We’re taking a pragmatic approach to find the best solution to
national security threats consistent with protection of civil liberties
and the rule of law. And we’re trying to avoid too many abstract
front-end rules that limit our options here.
– David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National

Security, U.S. Department of Justice2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Beyond its horrific immediate consequences, the monstrous attacks of September
11 left behind a poisonous political legacy in the United States. Not the least of the
harms inflicted was an intensification in the Bush administration’s already zealous
allegiance to presidentialism, a theory of government “that treat[s] our Constitution
as vesting in the President a fixed and expansive category of executive authority
largely immune to legislative control or judicial review.”3 Presidentialism operated in
the Bush administration as more than an abstract philosophy. It functioned as a
powerful guiding ethos in the behavior of executive branch officials. In both domestic
and foreign policy—but, most fatefully, I would argue, with regard to military and
national security policy—members of the Bush administration acted, to borrow Jack
Goldsmith’s phrase, as “executive power ideologues.”4 In their hands, as I have
written elsewhere, presidentialism bred “an insularity, defensiveness, and even
arrogance within the executive branch that undermine[d] sound decisionmaking,
discount[ed] the rule of law, and attenuate[d] the role of authentic deliberation in
shaping political outcomes.”5
	The aggressive presidentialism of the Bush-Cheney regime undoubtedly affected
how many supporters of presidential candidate Barack Obama understood his 2008
campaign slogan, “Change You Can Believe In.” The change they expected, or at
1.

President Barack Obama, Press Conference by the President (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/press-conference-president.

2.

Interview by Am. Constitution Soc’y Blog with David S. Kris, Assistant U.S. Att’y Gen. for Nat’l Sec.,
in D.C. (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/14425.

3.

Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American
Democracy 3 (2009).

4.

Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration
89 (2007).

5.

Shane, supra note 3, at 25.
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least hoped for, was a full-throated repudiation of presidentialism as an ideology. In
2007 then senator Obama had called for “[n]o more ignoring the law when it is
inconvenient.”6 Many voters no doubt hoped for the replacement of presidentialism
by an equally robust ideology of governance rooted in ideas like checks and balances,
public accountability, and the rule of law.
In May 2009 President Obama seemed to be repaying that hope. In a major
address at the National Archives on national security, he outlined a wide variety of
measures his administration had taken or was initiating to protect the nation against
terrorism. He prefaced his review, however, with the following:
I believe with every fiber of my being that in the long run we . . . cannot keep
this country safe unless we enlist the power of our most fundamental values.
The documents that we hold in this very hall—the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights—these are not simply
words written into aging parchment. They are the foundation of liberty and
justice in this country, and a light that shines for all who seek freedom,
fairness, equality, and dignity around the world.

I stand here today as someone whose own life was made possible by these
documents. My father came to these shores in search of the promise that they
offered. My mother made me rise before dawn to learn their truths when I
lived as a child in a foreign land. My own American journey was paved by
generations of citizens who gave meaning to those simple words—“to form a
more perfect union.” I’ve studied the Constitution as a student, I’ve taught it
as a teacher, I’ve been bound by it as a lawyer and a legislator. I took an oath
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief,
and as a citizen, I know that we must never, ever, turn our back on its enduring
principles for expedience sake.7

	Roughly halfway into his first term, however, President Obama—although
acknowledging and, in significant ways, advancing those values—does not seem to
have fully articulated a vision of the presidency that unambiguously turns its back on
Bush-Cheney presidentialism. Despite genuine achievements, for example, in helping
to depoliticize the Justice Department and advancing the cause of government
openness, the “big ideas” guiding his conception of the presidency still seem obscure,
even to many supporters. Instead of challenging the operating ideology of the Bush
administration head-on, he has often appeared to offer mainly his pragmatism as his
chief antidote to Bush-era abuses. By pragmatism, I mean the self-conscious
preference for “practical” approaches to addressing problems and challenges, in which
strategies are pursued based on facts, evidence, and structured rational discourse, but
which are also largely accepting of what decisionmakers regard as existing material
and political constraints on action. The epigram on national security policy that
6.

Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center: The War We Need to Win (Aug. 1,
2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/obamasp0807.pdf.

7.

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Nat’l Sec. (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter Obama
Nat’l Sec. Remarks], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the‑press‑office/remarks‑president‑
national‑security‑5‑21‑09.
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heads this essay, from then assistant attorney general David Kris, seems to capture
this mood.
	To be sure, as compared to the Bush style of governance, an avowed turn to
pragmatism may appear to be no small matter. On a host of issues, including many
that are critically related to U.S. national security in a post-9/11 world, the Bush
administration often seemed driven by ideology über alles. Conspicuous examples
include the decision to invade Iraq, the actual manner in which the invasion was
staged, and the defense of what everyone in the world except the Bush administration
was ready to call “torture.” These issues and many others looked to be all but
predetermined by political pre-commitments in a way that seemed oblivious to the
foreseeable consequences on the ground. Compared to, say, invading Iraq with
seeming disregard for the inevitably resulting empowerment of Iran, there is much to
be said for a policymaking approach that actually cares about outcomes.
	A pragmatic approach to policymaking, however, can be coherently interpreted
only within a substantive set of guiding values. Pursuing “practical strategies”
energetically, while articulating substantive values only vaguely and occasionally,
cannot succeed as an enduring antidote to Bush-style presidentialism. It cannot have
the permeating impact on executive branch behavior that one might seek from a
comprehensive re-articulation of the presidency based on checks and balances, public
accountability, and the rule of law. This is so for two related reasons: First, without a
substantive re-articulation of the presidency, many of the Obama administration’s
practical responses to particular problems are susceptible to being understood in
presidentialist terms—and thus, as legitimating presidentialism of even the BushCheney sort. That is precisely why, despite very genuine differences between the
Obama and Bush presidencies, President Obama’s national security actions are
frequently derided (or applauded) as being straightforward continuations of the prior
administration. 8 Second, unless presidential pragmatism is explicitly, even
emphatically, linked to a set of larger beliefs about the role and nature of the
presidency, it is unlikely to be an effective program for re-orienting executive branch
behavior and mobilizing popular support. The actions of both government bureaucrats
and voters in general are shaped by notions of who they are and the values to which
they owe allegiance. “Sensible, balanced outcomes” is too thin and indeterminate a
rallying cry to shape the identity of either citizens or officials in a way likely to
redirect our political life. This is especially so when the dominant presidentialist
narrative is so deeply entrenched in other cultural norms.
What I am suggesting here, of course, is not an abandonment of practicality, or a
return to rigidly ideological decisionmaking guided by a different ideology. I mean
instead to underscore the importance for presidential leadership of establishing clearly
the substantive values that guide the Obama administration’s pragmatism. When the
administration makes controversial decisions, those decisions ought to be defensible—
and publicly defended—within the terms of those larger values. Any hesitancy,
8.

See Glenn Greenwald, Obama’s embrace of Bush terrorism policies is celebrated as “Centrism,” Salon (May,
19, 2009), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/05/19/obama.
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unwillingness, or inability to tie the administration’s controversial decisions to its
larger beliefs cannot help but cripple the attempt to position the Obama presidency
as an effective alternative to the “executive power ideologues” it has succeeded.
	To clarify this argument, Parts II and III of this essay examine the Obama
administration’s record with regard to two critical areas of national security policy
that proved deeply problematic after 9/11—the treatment of enemy combatants and
the scope of government secrecy. In each section, I detail ways in which the Obama
administration has tried to distance itself from its predecessor. I also recount actions
that could be read as allowing Bush understandings of executive power to persist and
explain how the administration seems to be missing, intentionally or not, fairly
obvious opportunities to articulate a different conception of a post-9/11 presidency.
In Part IV, I speculate on the reasons for this seeming letdown and set forth what I
take to be its potential costs to our governance. It would require a much longer
work—albeit one I hope eventually to complete—to set out the alternative vision of
executive power that I would wish the administration to embrace. I conclude,
however, with at least a brief outline of that vision, which I call “the Democratic
Presidency” and which seems entirely consistent with at least President Obama’s
general pronouncements about legitimacy and the rule of law.
II. THE DETENTION, TREATMENT, AND TRIAL OF ENEMY COMBATANTS

	The most heated separation of powers controversies surrounding the Bush
administration centered on its prosecution of the “War on Terror.” At the top of the
list were Bush administration claims that the President could hold enemy combatants
at Guantánamo Bay without judicial review of their detention;9 that the President
could unilaterally interpret the Geneva Conventions as inapplicable to detainees
captured in Afghanistan;10 that, for alleged violations of the laws of war, the executive
branch could try accused enemy combatants by military commissions without
observing constitutional rights implicated in ordinary prosecutions;11 and that the
President could authorize harsh interrogation techniques regardless of either domestic
or international law banning torture.12
9.

Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001), reprinted in The
Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib 29 (Karen I. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).

10.

Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, & Robert J. Delabunty, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted in The
Torture Papers, supra note 9, at 38.

11.

Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 26, 2002), reprinted in The Torture
Papers, supra note 9, at 144.

12.

Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of the Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in The Torture
Papers, supra note 9, at 172.
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	The Supreme Court explicitly rebuffed the first three of these positions in a series of
three cases: Rasul v. Bush,13 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,14 and Boumediene v. Bush.15 In Rasul
the Court held that the general federal habeas corpus statute16 applied to Guantánamo
detainees. Thus, the petitioners, two Australian and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who were
captured in Afghanistan, could all challenge their detention under that statute.17
Hamdan, a suit brought pursuant to the federal habeas statute, challenged the
permissibility of trying Guantánamo detainees before military commissions. Hamdan
was a Yemeni national accused of working as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and
personal driver.18 The Court held that the Geneva Conventions apply to detainees in
Hamdan’s position; that he could enforce their protections through judicial suit; and
that Guantánamo military commissions as then constituted fell short of standards
imposed by the Geneva Conventions, as implemented by federal statutes.19 The
Court further held that military commissions could try defendants only for “war
crimes” and that the conspiracy charge lodged against Hamdan was not a war crime
as defined either by federal or customary international law.20
Boumediene, the Supreme Court’s most recent Guantánamo decision, returned to
the adjudication of enemy combatant status. Congress had reacted to Hamdan by
enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).21 The MCA provided a
relatively circumscribed process for reviewing administrative determinations that a
Guantánamo detainee was, in fact, an enemy combatant. The MCA otherwise
eliminated habeas access for non-citizens subject to its provisions. Boumediene held
the MCA’s bar to habeas unconstitutional. The majority concluded that, unless
enemy combatants have access to habeas review of their detention, the determination
of enemy combatant status, through a combination of administrative adjudication
and judicial oversight, has to provide a fully equivalent substitute to habeas in terms
of assuring a sound factual basis for the detention.22 The MCA scheme fell short.23
13.

542 U.S. 466 (2004).

14.

548 U.S. 557 (2006).

15.

553 U.S. 723 (2008).

16.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).

17.

542 U.S. at 466, 484.

18.

548 U.S. at 570.

19.

Id. at 628–29, 632, 634.

20. Id. at 563– 64.
21.

Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).

22.

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008).

23.

A fourth important loss for the administration was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a habeas case involving an alleged
enemy combatant who was also a U.S. citizen, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). The Court confirmed that the
Authorization to Use Military Force, which Congress enacted after September 11, 2001, gave the President
authority to detain enemy combatants captured in fighting against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, irrespective
of citizenship. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (discussing Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). It held,
however, that detention based on alleged enemy combatant status had to be based on administrative
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	The Supreme Court has not yet been called upon to decide on the fourth of the
Bush administration’s truly controversial positions—its limited definition of torture
and its assertion that Congress lacked the power to regulate the President’s power to
authorize wartime interrogation techniques. The Court’s decisions, however, clearly
imply a negative response. First, as noted above, Hamdan held the Geneva
Conventions applicable to detainees in the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.24
Moreover, four concurring Justices in Hamdan—Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg—specifically wrote, “The Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single
ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’”25 This obviously
implies congressional power to regulate the President’s conduct, and it is doubtful
that Justice Sotomayor, who succeeded Justice Souter, or Justice Kagan, the successor
to Hamdan’s author, Justice Stevens, would disagree.
	As of this writing, the Ninth Circuit is deciding an appeal from a decision
allowing former Justice Department attorney John Yoo to be sued for his alleged role
in sanctioning torture.26 Under then assistant attorney general Jack Goldsmith, the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) actually rescinded the opinions authored by professor
Yoo that purported to uphold the President’s authority to allow any interrogation
techniques he thought appropriate, regardless of applicable statutes. 27
On its second day in office, the Obama administration distanced itself from the
Bush administration’s positions on the Geneva Conventions and interrogation
techniques and aligned itself explicitly with the Supreme Court’s Guantánamo
holdings. Executive Order 13,491 asserted the appropriateness of the standards
articulated in the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 3 in guiding the conditions
of custody for all individuals detained in any armed conflict involving the United
States.28 It ordered the closing of all secret CIA detention facilities.29 It renounced all
legal guidance regarding interrogation rendered between September 11, 2001, and
January 20, 2009.30 A companion order created an interagency task force to conduct
procedures meeting constitutional standards of due process—a holding that prompted the Bush
administration to create the so-called Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) for this purpose. Id.
24.

Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628–29.

25.

Id. at 636 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

26. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
27.

Memorandum for the Files from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan 15, 2009) [hereinafter Bradbury Memo], http://www.
justice.gov/olc/docs/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.

28. Exec. Order No. 13,491, § 3(a), 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009).
29. Id. § 4, at 4894.
30. Id. § 1, at 4893. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had withdrawn several of the

relevant opinions under President George W. Bush. Bradbury Memo, supra note 27. OLC withdrew five
more under President Barack Obama. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Att’y Gen. (Apr. 15, 2009), http://
www.justice.gov/olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf; Memorandum from David J. Barron,
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen.
(June 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/memo‑barron2009.pdf.
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a comprehensive review of the lawful options available to the Federal
Government with respect to the apprehension, detention, trial, transfer,
release, or other disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in
connection with armed conf licts and counterterrorism operations, and to
identify such options as are consistent with the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice. 31

Yet a third executive order articulated the goal of closing Guantánamo within a
year32 and set in motion a process to review the status of all remaining Guantánamo
detainees with an eye toward their transfer to facilities in the United States,
prosecution, or possible release. This order specifically referred to “all applicable laws
governing the conditions of . . . confinement, including Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.” 33 That process yielded a January 2010 Task Force report
concerning the 240 then detainees at Guantánamo; 156 were found appropriate for
transfer to countries outside the United States, and 36 remained under active
investigation for possible prosecution. 34 That left only 48 detainees in de facto
“prisoner of war” status, i.e., “too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for
prosecution.”35
On the use of military commissions, President Obama waited until May 2009
before publicly stating that such commissions “are appropriate for trying enemies
who violate the laws of war, provided that they are properly structured and
administered.”36 In taking that stance, however, he indicated five respects in which
he felt the version of military commissions offered by the Bush administration was
inadequate.37 Following the President’s statement, then secretary of defense Robert
M. Gates amended military commission procedures to (1) prohibit the admission of
statements obtained through cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (2) give
detainees greater latitude in their choice of counsel; (3) afford protection for those
defendants who refuse to testify; (4) place the burden of justification for using hearsay
on the party trying to use it; and (5) confirm that military judges are empowered to

31.

Exec. Order No. 13,493, § 1(e), 74 Fed. Reg. 4901, 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009).

32.

Exec. Order No. 13,492, § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009).

33.

Id. § 6, at 4899.

34. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et al., Final Report of the Guantánamo Review Task Force, at ii

(2010), http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. Of the 156 detainees found
appropriate for transfer to countries outside the United States, “30 detainees from Yemen were designated
for ‘conditional’ detention based on the current security environment in that country. They are not
approved for repatriation to Yemen at this time, but they may be transferred to third countries, or
repatriated to Yemen in the future . . . .” Id.

35.

Id.

36. President Barack Obama, Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15,

2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the‑press‑office/statement‑president‑barack‑obama‑
military‑commissions.

37.

Id.
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determine their own jurisdiction.38 In October 2009 President Obama signed into
law the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 39 which made all five changes statutory.
In all of these respects, therefore—acknowledging the availability of habeas
review, applying the Geneva Conventions to all military detainees, renouncing the
use of harsh interrogation techniques, and increasing the procedural protections
entailed in military commissions—the Obama administration embraced positions
that the Bush administration initially resisted. Attorney General Eric Holder further
asserted the appropriateness of trying terrorist suspects, whenever possible, in Article
III federal courts, pushing back against political pressure to try all alleged enemy
combatants exclusively in military venues.40 Subjecting terrorists to prosecution and
punishment within the ordinary criminal justice system is itself a form of allegiance
to the rule of law. These are not small matters. And, in announcing these policy
changes, President Obama adverted explicitly, albeit summarily, to critical values
such as “the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals in United States
custody,”41 “the interests of justice,”42 and “the rule of law.”43
Yet, none of the relevant documents or accompanying presidential statements
offers any critique of the Bush theories of presidential authority that underpinned the
earlier administration’s stance on habeas corpus, military commissions, or the
interrogation and confinement of alleged enemy combatants. There has not been a
statement elaborating on what the President takes to be the demands of the “rule of
law” regarding the exercise of executive authority, or the ways in which “our deeply
held values” will be balanced against America’s “national security interests.”
In the absence of such statements, there stand several conspicuous points of
operational continuity between Bush and Obama policy that please Bush supporters
and trouble Bush critics: the detention of alleged enemy combatants without any
legal protections at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan,44 the continued use of
military commissions for trying enemy combatants for war crimes,45 and the indefinite
incarceration of at least some military detainees without trial.46 There also has
emerged a controversy, not raised to public attention during the Bush administration,
38. Id.; Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. Research Serv., R 41163, The Military Commissions Act of

2009: Overview of Legal Issues 3 (2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41163.pdf.

39.

Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).

40. Eric Holder, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the U.S. Constitution Project Awards Dinner

(Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag‑speech‑1004152.html.

41.

Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 28, at 4893.

42.

Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 32, at 4897.

43.

Obama Nat’l Sec. Remarks, supra note 7.

44. William Fisher, Bagram’s “New” Rules. So What’s New?, Huffington Post (Sept. 14, 2009), http://

www.huffingtonpost.com/william‑fisher/bagrams‑new‑rules‑so‑what_b_285638.html.

45.

Peter Finn, Detainee Khadr Pleads Guilty, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 2010, at A06, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp‑dyn/content/article/2010/10/25/AR2010102505473.html.

46. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et al., supra note 34, at 12.
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that has plainly vexed progressive critics of President Obama’s predecessor: whether
(and in what form) the President is bound by constitutional requirements of due
process before consigning a U.S. citizen to a CIA “kill-or-capture” list. This
particular controversy over targeted killing arose after the Los Angeles Times reported
in April 2010 that the Obama administration had authorized the capture or killing
of Anwar al-Aulaqi,47 a Muslim cleric born in New Mexico to Yemeni parents.48
	Al-Aulaqi’s father subsequently brought suit, as his son’s putative “next friend,”
seeking to enjoin the intentional killing of his son outside an armed conflict, unless
he poses an imminent threat to life or physical safety and no less draconian measures
are available to neutralize his threat.49 In its opposition brief, the administration
characterizes al-Aulaqi as follows:
Anwar al-Aulaqi is a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen and a leader of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a Yemen-based terrorist group that has claimed
responsibility for numerous armed terrorist attacks against American, Saudi
Arabian, Korean and Yemeni targets since January 2009. [He] has recruited
individuals to join AQAP, facilitated training at camps in Yemen in support
of acts of terrorism, and helped focus AQAP’s attention on attacking U.S.
interests. In addition, since late 2009, Anwar al-Aulaqi has taken on an
increasingly operational role in AQAP, including preparing Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab in his attempt to detonate an explosive device aboard a
Northwest Airlines f light from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day
2009. The United States has further determined that AQAP is an organized
armed group that is either part of al-Qaeda, or is an associated force, or
cobelligerent, of al-Qaeda that has directed armed attacks against the United
States in the noninternational armed conflict between the United States and
al-Qaeda that the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.50

These facts appear to be uncontradicted. The Obama administration urged dismissal
of the suit on a variety of grounds, including the father’s alleged lack of standing, the
nonjusticiability of the questions posed, the court’s equitable discretion to deny relief,
and the lack of a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute.51 The administration
also asserted, as a final ground for dismissing the suit—a ground it explicitly and
successfully urged the Court not to reach—that litigating the father’s claim would

47.

In both official documents and journalistic accounts, “Aulaqi” is variously spelled “Aulaqi,” “Awlaqi,”
and “Awlaki.” I am using “Aulaqi,” as reflected in court documents, except where quoting from a text
that uses a different spelling.

48. David S. Cloud, Awlaki is Added to CIA Target List, L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 2010, at 8, available at http://

articles.latimes/com/2010/apr/06/world/la-fg/yemen-cleric7-2010apr07.

49. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 1, 10, Al-Aulaqi v.

Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-1469), 2010 WL 3555385, at *2, *6.

50. Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv1469), 2010 WL 3863135, at *2.

51.

Id. at 9–42.
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entail the disclosure of information protected by the state secrets privilege.52 Not
surprisingly, upon the filing of the government’s brief, the New York Times headline
read: “State Secrets Cited in Effort by White House to Block Suit.”53 A widely read
progressive reporter summarized the oral argument as follows: “Lawyers for the
Barack Obama administration told a federal judge . . . that the U.S. government has
authority to kill U.S. citizens whom the executive branch has unilaterally determined
pose a threat to national security.”54
It is not difficult to imagine why Anwar al-Aulaqi would be targeted for a killor-capture list. What seems striking, however—especially in light of the campaign
theme of “change”—is the administration’s apparent decision not to discuss in any
detail its operating standards, its decisionmaking processes, or their application to
al-Aulaqi. Outside the litigation, the administration’s sole public stance seems to
have been articulated in a briefing with then White House press secretary Robert
Gibbs. It is worth considering the exchange as a whole, in order to see why the
administration’s critics see so little change from the Bush administration:
Q: Human rights lawyers are challenging the administration’s assertion that
an American citizen can be targeted for killing overseas. Should Americans
worry that if they go overseas, their own government could target them to be
killed? Anwar al-Awlaki is the person in question, but the legal principle—

MR. GIBBS: Okay, let’s—let me just for the point of—I don’t know what I
would make—I think you just largely said a tourist going overseas and Anwar
al-Awlaki are somehow analogous in nature. I’m not a—
Q: But if the U.S. decides that an American citizen is affiliated with a terrorist
group—
MR. GIBBS: No, no, let’s be clear, let’s be—no, no, let’s be clear.
Q: Is there any legal process?
MR. GIBBS: Let’s be clear about Anwar al-Awlaki, okay? The United States
hasn’t decided that Anwar al-Awlaki is aligned with a terrorist group. Anwar
al-Awlaki has in videos cast his lot with al Qaeda and its extremist allies.
Anwar al-Awlaki is acting as a regional commander for al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula. So let’s not take a tourist that might visit Italy overseas
and equate him to somebody who has on countless times in video pledged to
uphold and support the violent and murderous theories of al Qaeda. There—
Q: The U.S. has mistakenly identified people as terrorists in many instances
in the last eight years, and if Americans can be targeted for killing—
52.

Id. at 43–59.

53.

Charlie Savage, State Secrets Cited in Effort by White House to Block Suit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 2010 at 7,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/world/25awlaki.html.

54. William Fisher, Obama Lawyers Defend “Kill Lists,” Inter Press Service News Agency (Nov. 9,
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MR. GIBBS: Ari, it’s hard to imagine an issue in which two things have been
conf lated more than your question in the past 18 months of me taking
questions here. I think the notion that somehow anybody in this country
confuses traveling overseas and the role that Anwar al-Awlaki has in inciting
violence—they’re not even in the same ballpark.
Q: Are you acknowledging that Awlaki is on the assassination list, then?
MR. GIBBS: I just answered his question about comparing Joe the Tourist to
Anwar al-Awlaki.
Q: Just a quick follow to that. U.S. citizens are entitled to a certain judicial
process when it comes to questions like this, when it comes to sentencing to
death. And is there a process in place that we don’t know about?
MR. GIBBS: There’s a process in place that I’m not at liberty to discuss.
....
Q: [T]here is a lawsuit that the Center for Constitutional Rights and the
ACLU is bringing today regarding the policies or lack—perceived lack of
policies as they relate to Mr. al-Awlaki. And what I wanted to ask is—I mean,
you just told us there is a process in place that you’re not at liberty to discuss.
Is that going to be the government’s position, or are you going to disclose
what the policy is? Do you think there’s any merit to this lawsuit?
MR. GIBBS: Well, look, again, there is—I’m just not at liberty to discuss
intelligence matters, Margaret. I would say—I will repeat that Anwar
al-Awlaki is someone who has sworn allegiance to al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, is a regional commander for that group in Yemen, has and
continues to direct attacks there and, as we know, against innocent men,
women and children in this country. And this President will take the steps
necessary to keep our country safe from thugs like him.
Q: I understand that. But the President is also a lawyer with constitutional
law training. He made clear during the campaign that sort of dotting the i’s
and crossing the t’s mattered, even if you’re going after bad guys.
MR. GIBBS: And I think it’s safe to assume that if—without getting deep
into this—the President understands the process and the President will do all
that is necessary to keep this country safe from people like him.55

	To his credit, Mr. Gibbs nowhere says that the President has inherent
constitutional authority to kill at-will any American whom the President perceives to
be a threat to national security. But note how the press secretary dodges the substance
of every question. The reporter asks about the administration’s position regarding
Americans who “go overseas.” Gibbs limits the question to “tourists,” and then
55.

Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Robert Gibbs (Aug. 3, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-832010.
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belittles the hypothetical. He says he cannot discuss the relevant decisionmaking
process, but that Mr. Obama “understands the process,” and that the President “will
do all that is necessary” to protect the United States against al-Aulaqi and his ilk. He
simply refuses to engage the question whether there is any tension between the
handling of the al-Aulaqi matter and the President’s campaign stance. To anyone
critical of Bush administration positions on presidential authority, the Gibbs
defense—and, to some extent, even the more carefully argued administration position
urged in the al-Aulaqi case—seem to echo the President’s post-midterm
acknowledgment, quoted above: “[W]e were in such a hurry to get things done that
we didn’t change how things got done.”
By way of contrast, as a “thought experiment,” imagine an administration that
explains the principles behind its decisionmaking in a way that clarifies the
administration’s allegiance to the rule of law:
Following September 11, Congress authorized the President to use “all
necessary and appropriate force” against those organizations that “committed . . .
the [September 11] terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such . . . organizations.”56
Anwar al-Aulaqi is a leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
an organized armed group that is either part of al-Qaeda, or an associated
force, or cobelligerent, of al-Qaeda that has directed armed attacks against
the United States. From the evidence available to us, there is no doubt that
Mr. al-Aulaqi, if physically present in the United States, would be subject to
lawful apprehension by federal authorities. The problem is, he is not in the
United States. Therefore, the tools available to us of “necessary and appropriate
force” to mitigate the threat of attacks on the United States by Mr. al-Aulaqi
are not the tools of ordinary law enforcement.

The Constitution prohibits this government from depriving any person of life
or liberty without due process. As an American citizen, Mr. al-Aulaqi enjoys
this protection, wherever he may be. The Supreme Court has stated, however,
that due process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances.”57 Without confirming or denying any
decision that has been made with regard to Mr. al-Aulaqi, what we believe
due process requires in cases like his is a course of fact-finding within the
executive branch that is exceptional in its rigor and intensity. Congress having
created no judicial review process for cases such as this, we proceed on our
own initiative. In exercising that initiative, we proceed based only on evidence
as compelling as the seriousness of our contemplated action may warrant.

In just two hypothetical paragraphs, the administration could make clear five
things that Mr. Gibbs’s response either obfuscates or ignores. First, the President is
proceeding based on statutory authority. Second, the executive branch distinguishes
between Americans abroad and Americans on home territory. Third, due process
applies to Mr. al-Aulaqi. Fourth, the executive branch does not seek judicial review
56. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
57.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
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of its determinations to use force because no such review is available. (The President
would not have to say in what circumstances, if any, he thinks Congress could or
should constitutionally authorize such review.) Fifth, the executive regards itself as
constitutionally bound to follow a fact-finding process of utmost care in dealing with
the use of potentially fatal force against a U.S. citizen, even one who has taken up
arms against the United States. Although I have no inside knowledge, I am confident
that the positions I have posited here are actually aligned with most of the
administration’s legal thinking. Thus, failing to articulate something like the script I
have imagined strikes me as a perfect example of what looks like the Obama
administration’s hesitancy, unwillingness, or inability to tie controversial decisions to
its larger beliefs—in this case, beliefs in due process, the rule of law, and checks and
balances in the management of national security. The absence of such a statement
creates ambiguity about the administration’s stance on presidentialism that some
critics, otherwise politically sympathetic to the administration, understandably
bemoan.
III. GOVERNMENT SECRECY

	Another manifestation of the Bush administration’s belief in the President’s
narrow accountability was its frequent insistence on secrecy. For fiscal years 2002
through 2004, there were dramatic increases in the number of pages of classified
documents and corresponding decreases in the number of pages declassified.58 Large
numbers of documents and databases were removed from government websites.59
There was a notable jump in refusals to disclose records requested by members of the
public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), even though the number of
times agencies relied on national security exemptions to FOIA dropped.60 Former
vice president Dick Cheney litigated relentlessly to fend off public disclosure of who
in the oil industry had met with his task force to develop the administration’s
legislative proposals on energy.61 Perhaps oddest of all was a November 1, 2001,
executive order concerning the government’s handling of presidential records from
prior administrations—an order that, among other things, purported to allow the
family of a disabled former President to choose a personal representative who might
claim executive privilege in the name of that President, 62 a claim that the order
supposedly made binding on the National Archivist regardless of the views of the
incumbent President.63
58. Info. Sec. Oversight Office, 2005 Report to the President 13 (2006), http://www.archives.gov/

isoo/reports/2005‑annual‑report.pdf.

59.

John Podesta, Need to Know: Governing in Secret, in A Little Knowledge: Privacy, Security and
Public Information After September 11, at 11, 13–14 (Peter M. Shane, et al. eds., 2004).

60. See Coal. of Journalists for Open Gov’t, Federal Government Continues to Fall Behind In

Responding to FOIA Requests, CJOG Finds 1–3 (2006), http://www.cjog.net/documents/.pdf.

61.

Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 372 (2004).

62. Exec. Order No. 13,233, § 10, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025, 56,028 (Nov. 1, 2001).
63. Id. § 3(d)(1) at 56,026–27.
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	As it did with regard to Guantánamo, the Obama administration took a number
of early steps to distance itself in both philosophy and practice from the Bush
administration in relation to releasing information. On his first full day in office,
President Obama devoted his first executive order to rescinding the Bush executive
order on the control of records from prior administrations and replacing it with a
system far less aggressive in its accommodation of executive privilege claims.64 He
likewise issued a memorandum pledging “an unprecedented level of openness in
Government.”65 The memo
direct[s] the Chief Technology Officer, in coordination with the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Administrator of
General Services, to coordinate the development by appropriate executive
departments and agencies, within 120 days, of recommendations for an Open
Government Directive, to be issued by the Director of OMB, that instructs
executive departments and agencies to take specific actions implementing the
principles set forth in this memorandum.66

A presidential memorandum on FOIA implementation, also issued on January 21,
2009, announced the policy position: “All agencies should adopt a presumption in
favor of disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to the principles embodied
in [the] FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open Government. The presumption of
disclosure should be applied to all decisions involving FOIA.”67 President Obama
directed “the Attorney General to issue new guidelines governing the FOIA to the
heads of executive departments and agencies, reaffirming the commitment to
accountability and transparency, and to publish such guidelines in the Federal
Register.”68 On March 19, 2009, Attorney General Holder issued his directive. He
rescinded a 2001 policy promulgated by former attorney general John Ashcroft that
committed the Department of Justice (DOJ) in almost all cases to defend decisions
to withhold records if supported by a “sound legal basis.”69 It provided, instead, that
the DOJ would “defend a denial of a FOIA request only if (1) the agency reasonably
foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory
exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law.”70 The requirement of actual harm

64. Exec. Order No. 13,489, § 4, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669, 4670 (Jan. 21, 2009).
65.

Memorandum on Transparency & Open Gov’t from the President to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).

66. Id.
67.

Memorandum on Freedom of Info. Act from the President for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies,
74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).

68. Id.
69. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Dep’t of Justice, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies

1–2 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia‑memo‑march2009.pdf.

70. Id. at 2.
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aligned the Holder Justice Department’s FOIA policy with those of the Carter and
Clinton administrations.71
	There’s no doubt that these position shifts have been accompanied by at least
some important concrete actions that distance the Obama administration from the
Bush administration. In February 2009 the Obama Defense Department lifted the
ban on photographing the coffins of returning war dead from Iraq and Afghanistan.72
In September 2009 the White House agreed to post its visitor logs online, containing
information on all but a few narrow categories of visitors to the President or Vice
President.73 In December 2009 President Obama issued an executive order that not
only shifted the standards for handling national security information in the direction
of greater access, but also created a National Declassification Center in the National
Archives.74 The Center’s mandate is to achieve by December 31, 2013, public access
to all properly declassified records within a backlog of over 400 million pages of
records that have been withheld so far from automatic declassification.75 In January
2010 the administration released the names of detainees at the Bagram Air Force
Base in Afghanistan.76
In late 2009, intelligence agencies also began to disgorge records that the
Electronic Freedom Foundation had requested from the Bush administration
documenting agency misconduct. These encompassed, for example, a Defense
Department document release including
A report that the Joint Forces Command, working with the FBI, improperly
collected and disseminated intelligence on Planned Parenthood and a white
supremacist group called the National Alliance, as part of preparations for
the 2002 Olympics.
A North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) briefing
improperly included intelligence on an antiwar group called Alaskans for
Peace and Justice in 2005 . . . .
A report from 2003 of a closed investigation into prisoner abuse at Abu
Ghraib and other sites in Iraq . . . . [and]

71.

See Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard A. Merrill & Peter M. Shane, Administrative Law: The
American Public Law System 768 (6th ed. 2009).

72. Martin Sieff, Photo ban on Iraq war dead lifted, UPI.com (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.upi.com/news/

issueoftheday/2009/02/27/Photo‑ban‑on‑Iraq‑war‑dead‑lifted/UPI‑33241235755703.

73. White House Voluntary Disclosure Policy: Visitor Access Records, WhiteHouse.gov (Sept. 4, 2009), http://
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Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 3.7, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 719 (Dec. 29, 2009).

75. Memorandum on Implementation of the Exec. Order, “Classified Nat’l Sec. Info.,” from the President

to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 733 (Dec. 29, 2009).
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Times, Jan. 16, 2010, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/asia/17afghan.
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A 2008 report that Army Signals Intelligence in Louisiana intercepted
civilian cell phone conversations.77

Such initiatives were all taken in addition to a variety of ambitious government-wide
transparency measures implementing the Office of Management and Budget’s Open
Government Directive, which was finally issued on December 8, 2009.78
In September 2009 the administration adopted a new policy and set of procedures
aimed at limiting both the invocation of the so-called state secrets privilege and the
consequences for public accountability when the privilege is invoked. Specifically,
under a new Justice Department policy, the attorney general committed the Justice
Department to invoking the privilege to prevent only “significant” harm to national
security.79 He pledged that the privilege would not be invoked to conceal violations
of law or merely embarrassing behavior.80 Should any agency wish the privilege to be
invoked on its behalf, it must now provide to the Justice Department a detailed
justification, which, in turn, must be endorsed by the assistant attorney general
(AAG) in charge of the relevant litigating division. Should the AAG recommend
invocation, that recommendation would be reviewed by a newly constituted State
Secrets Review Committee, whose recommendation, in turn, would go to the deputy
attorney general and, if approved, to the attorney general. The privilege is not to be
invoked without the attorney general’s sign-off. The attorney general, if he or she
invokes the privilege, is to report the matter to the relevant agency inspector general
should the attorney general find plausible the underlying assertions of wrongdoing.
Despite the new procedure, however, the administration has persisted in invoking
the state secrets privilege in litigation aimed at establishing accountability for alleged
violations of law by the Bush administration. Prior to the elaboration of the attorney
general’s new policy, the Holder Justice Department had already invoked the state
secrets privilege to secure the dismissal of suits related to the Bush administration’s
extraordinary renditions81 and the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP)82 —the
program of warrantless electronic surveillance conducted by the NSA in apparent
defiance of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.83 Even with the new policy in
place, the administration has continued to invoke the privilege in new TSP-related
77.

William Fisher, DoD Releases Records of Illegal Surveillance, Truth-Out (Mar. 3, 2010), http://archive.
truthout.org/dod-releases-records-illegal-surveillance57329.

78. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &

Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf.

79. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1
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litigation.84 This stance is all the more notable, of course, because candidate Obama
was critical of the Terrorist Surveillance Program,85 and President Obama, early on,
directed an end to the practice of extraordinary rendition.86 In stymying litigation
involving extraordinary renditions and the TSP, the Obama administration appears
to be thwarting the very value of government accountability that it adopted with
much fanfare as its operating watchword.
	As with its conduct on the substantive aspects of antiterrorism policy, we see
again a seeming reluctance by the Obama administration to connect its stance on
state secrets with larger ideas about executive power and public accountability. To be
sure, the Holder September 2009 policy statement seeks to place state secrets
determinations within a sensible values framework. It foreswears use of the privilege
to protect information unless the release of that information would work significant
harm to national security.87 It promises to use the privilege as the basis for seeking
dismissal of a case or claim only when continued pursuit of the case or claim would
portend such harm. The policy gestures towards accountability by committing the
attorney general to seek inspector general investigations of any claims raised, which—
although opposed in court on state secrets grounds—nonetheless raise “credible
allegations of government wrongdoing.”88 Unfortunately, in terms of distancing the
Obama administration from the Bush administration’s excesses, there is no way of
knowing whether this policy makes any operational difference at all.
Of course, it is possible that the policy is doing just the job it should. For all we
know, when the state secrets privilege has been invoked by the Obama administration,
the government lawyers involved, including the attorney general, may have been
appropriately persuaded by their client agencies that the disclosure of the disputed
material would, indeed, work significant harm to the national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States. For all we know, the process outlined has led to
the rejection of some potential state secrets claims that would have been raised by
other administrations. For all we know, it may even be that the policy has resulted in
internal investigations that are rooting out government wrongdoing. The problem is,
of course, that we know nothing. The Obama administration has not made a public
case for any of this—a silence that continues to fuel claims on both the left and right
that, on matters of government secrecy in the national security area, there is no
meaningful difference between the Obama administration and its predecessor.

84. Justin Elliott, Obama Adopts Bush’s State Secrets Position—And Exact Language—In NSA Spying Case,

Talking Points Memo (Nov. 2, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/
2009/11/obama_adopts_bushs_state_secrets_position_--_and_e.php.

85. Anne Broache, Obama: No warrantless wiretaps if you elect me, CNET News (Jan. 8, 2008, 1:16 PM),
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86. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4895 (2009).
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Indeed, in the public mind—and certainly, in the mind of its critics—the proper
frame for understanding the administration’s stance on state secrets is not its
assertedly robust commitment to openness in other contexts, but rather its apparent
unwillingness to hold anyone accountable for the abuses of the Bush administration.
Thus, for example, the administration has declined to pursue discipline against
Justice Department attorneys who provided written advice “riddled with weird
arguments, cherry-picked quotations, and inexplicable omissions,”89 which provided
legal cover for torture.90 It has declined to prosecute CIA personnel who destroyed
videotapes showing the CIA’s interrogation of al-Qaeda members.91 It has resisted
the idea of an independent commission to look broadly at the rule of law under the
Bush administration.92 It has even opposed a FOIA suit aimed at obtaining the
names of lobbyists who met with government officials to push for a grant of legislative
immunity for telecommunications companies that collaborated with the Bush
administration in warrantless electronic surveillance in violation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act.93 In the meantime, other nations have exercised the
initiative to apologize and compensate their citizens for harms they suffered due to
Bush administration policies.94

89. David Luban, David Margolis is Wrong, Slate (Feb. 22, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.slate.com/

id/2245531/pagenum/all.

90. See Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., to the Att’y Gen. & Deputy Att’y

Gen. 3 ( Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Margolis Memo], http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf.

91.
92.

Carrie Johnson, No Charges in Destruction of CIA Interrogation Tapes, NPR (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=131184938.
I know that these debates [about actions of the Bush administration] lead directly, in some
cases, to a call for a fuller accounting, perhaps through an independent commission.

I’ve opposed the creation of such a commission because I believe that our existing
democratic institutions are strong enough to deliver accountability. The Congress can
review abuses of our values, and there are ongoing inquiries by the Congress into matters
like enhanced interrogation techniques. The Department of Justice and our courts can
work through and punish any violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice.
It’s no secret there is a tendency in Washington to spend our time pointing fingers at
one another. And it’s no secret that our media culture feeds the impulse that lead[s] to
a good fight and good copy. But nothing will contribute more than that than a extended
relitigation of the last eight years. Already, we’ve seen how that kind of effort only leads
those in Washington to different sides to laying blame. It can distract us from focusing
our time, our efforts, and our politics on the challenges of the future.

Obama Nat’l Sec. Remarks, supra note 7, at 10–11.
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It has been reported that Attorney General Holder is not himself entirely pleased
with this record.95 He appointed a special counsel to look into possible acts of torture
directed at U.S. detainees96 —albeit excluding any cases where interrogation
techniques were consistent with the Justice Department’s earlier legal advice.97 It is
not clear, however, that the Attorney General enjoys White House support for even
this modest initiative. Perhaps referring to President Obama’s remarks resisting
investigation by an independent commission,98 former White House chief of staff
Rahm Emanuel is reported to have reacted: “Didn’t [Holder] get the memo that
we’re not re-litigating the past?”99 The problem with this reaction, however, is that
significant aspects of the past have never been litigated at all, much less re-litigated.
Attempting to clean up prior abuses without any clear record of what they were, who
committed them, or why they actually amounted to abuses under the law, leaves
intact and unchallenged the historical precedent set by the prior administration’s
abuse of power.
Following revelations of massive, illegal domestic intelligence operations during
the Nixon administration, the United States had the benefit of high-level investigations
by the Rockefeller Commission, appointed by President Gerald Ford, and by the
House and the Senate, chaired by Representative Otis Pike and Senator Frank
Church, respectively.100 The exhaustive report of the Church Committee101 is credited
with lending impetus to both the reorganization of intelligence oversight in Congress
and eventual enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Perhaps even
more importantly, it created a historical record that Americans thereafter could rely
on as a basis for democratic debate about national security and intelligence gathering.
It represented checks and balances at their best.
By contrast, in the wake of the Bush administration, we largely have obscurity
and evasion with regard to both the conduct of torture and the massive, unlawful
disregard of the law on electronic surveillance. Professor David Cole thus sees the

95. See Wil S. Hylton, Hope. Change. Reality., GQ , Dec. 2010, at 180, available at http://www.gq.com/
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Obama administration as complicit in “our collective failure to confront the wrongs
of the past.”102 In Cole’s words:
As long as we fail to look back, . . . the future of our policies regarding “enemy
combatants” . . . will continue to be tainted, encased in soundproof glass, a
secret hidden from no one but ourselves. Successfully restoring the rule of law
in our struggle against terrorism may not require the release of all detainees
held without criminal conviction, but it does require accountability for the
crimes committed by some of the United States’ highest officials.103

In its handling of state secrets, as with its handling of other aspects of national
security policy, the administration seems to be missing opportunities to re-articulate
the role of the federal executive in a post-9/11 world.
IV.	PRAGMATISM AND NARRATIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY IN THE WAKE OF
SEPTEMBER 11

	The Obama administration began with a number of express statements of
philosophical disagreement with how the Bush administration exercised executive
power. Its record reinforces this rhetorical distance from the Bush administration
with some important changes in government behavior, but it also reveals a number of
continuing, controversial operations in what seems like the Bush mode. These points
of continuity, whether the continued use of military commissions or the continued
invocation of the state secrets privilege to ward off judicial inquiries into torture and
warrantless surveillance, cannot help but cast doubt on the significance of the rhetoric
and dishearten the President’s political supporters. They also risk implicitly ratifying
the ideology of governance that reigned during the Bush-Cheney administration.
	This state of affairs is not inevitable. Differences between the two administrations’
philosophies are undoubtedly most conspicuous when the Obama administration
makes operational decisions plainly at odds with the likely approach of the Bush
administration. But it may well be the case that specific decisions made by the
Obama administration—even when identical to decisions that would have been made
by the Bush administration—could be justified even under theories of executive
power and the rule of law that differ substantially from those of President Obama’s
predecessor. What is missing is what Yale literature professor David Bromwich has
called “the middle layer of explanation” in politics:104 “This is the level at which one
must articulate the reasons for a policy, along with the understanding of the public
good from which the policy has issued and the historical context that makes it
necessary and desirable.”105 Individual Obama administration decisions may well be
defensible along these lines, but that defense cannot be merely implicit. It must be
102. David Cole, What to Do About Guantánamo?, N.Y. Rev. of Books (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.nybooks.

com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/what-do-about-guantanamo.

103. Id.
104. David Bromwich, The Dying Art of Political Explanation, Huffington Post (Oct. 16, 2010, 2:32 PM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david‑bromwich/the‑dying‑art‑of‑politica_b_765361.html.

105. Id.
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reiterated on many more occasions than a single speech five months into the
presidency.
Why has the Obama administration not done this? There are, I imagine, at least
three reasons. The first is a chronic institutional reluctance within the executive
branch to suggest limits or to support constraints on its powers. This is not
invariable—Presidents Ford and Carter both supported congressional regulation of
presidential records in the wake of Watergate,106 and President James Carter supported
both the Ethics in Government Act of 1978107 and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. But where Presidents perceive that they are likely be judged on
accomplishment, there would be an understandable reluctance to risk limiting their
own (or their successors’) sphere of potential action. In the case of President Obama—
who is facing enormous problems on both the domestic and international fronts, as
well as a divided government—this risk may seem particularly unwelcome. And,
especially in the national security sphere, I suspect that there are many career
personnel in the executive branch who would actually embrace Bush-style
presidentialism as a matter of principle and so would not counsel any form of
presidential modesty about executive power.
	The second is politics. With the country still grappling with the effects of a
devastating recession, as well as the need for pressing action on healthcare, climate
change, and immigration, the President might well want to avoid the appearance of
diluting his focus. Moreover, since the Johnson administration, Republicans have
consistently—and with some success—cowed the Democrats by portraying them as
soft on national security issues. The partisan pushback against any Obama
administration effort to reinvigorate the rule of law in the national security context is
likely to be vicious, threatening to erode whatever modicum of goodwill might
otherwise be available to accomplish seemingly more concrete and immediate
objectives. This, of course, is not hypothetical. We can see it in Republican efforts to
derail the closing of Guantánamo and in proposals to prohibit the trial of foreign
terrorists in civilian courts108—a practice that Republicans seemed happier to live
with under George W. Bush.109
	And the third is insularity. From inside the administration, the philosophical
distance between it and its predecessor, even when similar decisions are made, may
106. Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977).
107. Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
108. E.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 124

Stat. 4137, 4351 (2011) (prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to transfer Guantánamo detainees to
the United States); Naftali Bendavid & Jess Bravin, Republicans Step Up Protests of Civilian Terror Trials,
Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 2010, at A5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487037625
04575037550051072986.html.

109. On the number of terrorism-related convictions in civilian court under President Bush, see Letter from

Sen. Ronald Weich, Asst. Att’y Gen., to Sen. Leahy & Sessions (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/terrorism-crimes-letter.html (“319 convictions or guilty pleas in terrorism or
terrorism-related cases arising from investigations conducted primarily after September 11, 2001 . . . . ”
(quoting Dep’t of Justice, FY2009 Budget and Performance Summary pt.1, at 1, http://www.
justice.gov/jmd/2009summary/pdf/fy2009-bud-sum.pdf)).
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not look at all obscure. President Obama’s May 2009 speech really did seem to signal
a philosophical departure; as long as he sits in the Oval Office, the message still
seems to be there—for administration insiders. The administration has also enjoyed,
and in many cases continues to enjoy, the legal counsel of some of the most thoughtful
progressive lawyers one could imagine—people like David Barron,110 Harold Koh,111
Neal Katyal,112 Martin Lederman,113 and even the President and Attorney General
Holder themselves. With lawyers of such progressive credentials involved in the
administration’s decisionmaking—as compared to, say, David Addington,114 Jay
Bybee,115 Alberto Gonzales,116 or John Yoo117—it may seem unthinkable to insiders
110. Harvard Law professor David Barron served in the Justice Department’s OLC from 2009–2010,

including a stint as acting assistant attorney general. Barron appointed Prinicpal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, Harv. L. Sch. (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/2009/01/20_barron.html. With professor Martin Lederman, he wrote The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, a devastating critique of the
Bush administration’s position that the President, as Commander in Chief, acts outside Congress’s
permissible regulatory scope. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689
(2008).

111. Harold Koh, legal advisor to the Department of State, served in the Clinton administration as assistant

secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. His biography on the website of Yale Law
School, where he served as dean from 2005–2009, indicates he has won “more than thirty awards for his
human rights work.” Harold Hongju Koh, Yale L. Sch., http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/HKoh.htm
(last visited May 31, 2011).

112. Neal Katyal, acting solicitor general of the United States, was lead counsel for the petitioner in Hamdan

v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006); See Neal K. Katyal, Geo. L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/
facinfo/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=Faculty&ID=272 (last visited May 31, 2011).

113. Georgetown law professor Martin Lederman was deputy assistant attorney general in the OLC from

2009–2010, and co-authored The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine,
and Original Understanding. Barron & Lederman, supra note 110; Martin S. Lederman, Geo. L., http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/facinfo/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=Faculty&ID=2134 (last visited May
31, 2011).

114. As counsel and then chief of staff to former vice president Dick Cheney, David Addington was “by far

the most important member of the [Bush administration’s] legal team when it came to orchestrating its
presidential-power agenda.” Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency
and the Subversion of American Democracy 83 (2007).

115. As assistant attorney general in charge of the OLC, Jay Bybee signed memoranda arguing the

inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions to al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees, along with memoranda
approving harsh interrogation techniques and the use of military commissions. The Torture Papers,
supra note 9, at 81, 136, 144, 172.

116. As White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales instructed his legal team “to be vigilant about seizing any

opportunity to expand presidential power.” Savage, supra note 114, at 73. He also presided over meetings
that led to the purported legal justification of harsh interrogations for CIA detainees. Id. at 154–55. In
March 2004, he participated in a notorious late-night visit to the hospitalized then attorney general
John Ashcroft to elicit his reversal of then acting attorney general James Comey’s refusal to approve the
Terrorist Surveillance Program in its then current form. See Harold H. Bruff, Bad Advice: Bush’s
Lawyers in the War on Terror 153 (2009).

117. In the weeks immediately following September 11, the then deputy assistant attorney general in charge

of the OLC, John Yoo, wrote a confidential analysis of the President’s war powers that formed the
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that anyone could mistake their views of the presidency or the rule of law for the
views of the Bush administration. Of course, except for the President, these names
are all but unknown to the general public, and the fact of their availability for public
service during the Obama administration is unlikely by itself to lay any kind of
groundwork for a re-imagination of the presidency.
It is understandable, based on these reasons, why the Obama administration
might seem especially hesitant, perhaps even afraid, to mount a full-throated
campaign for a view of the presidency that differs from Bush-Cheney presidentialism.
But it is a critical project to undertake. I have previously argued in some detail that
the Bush-Cheney view of the presidency is harmful to governance.118 It makes the
bureaucracy less accountable.119 It leads to bad, sometimes unlawful, decisionmaking.
It creates an organizational ethos of entitlement that undermines conscientious
government lawyering. What makes full-throated resistance to presidentialism so
critical, moreover, is that we are living in a moment when contemporary American
culture seemingly has no room for an account of the presidency that is not
fundamentally hierarchical and unaccountable.
In discussing his own presidency, George W. Bush and his supporters were fond
of connecting to two images—that of the corporate CEO120 and that of the
Commander in Chief.121 With regard to the latter, it seemed to be all but forgotten
that the constitutional job title is “Commander in Chief,” not of the government, but
“of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States.”122 Indeed, perhaps the most
obvious textual refutation of the argument that the Article II Vesting Clause123
demands a “unitary presidency” is that such a reading of the presidency would make
the Commander-in-Chief Clause superfluous.
Free-market business values have become so hegemonic in our public discourse,
however, that it is truly the conflation of the constitutional chief executive with the
corporate CEO that is most dangerous. I have long been puzzled by conservative
voters’ seeming approbation of the imperial presidency because such a presidency is
analytic framework for much of OLC’s lawyering regarding the War on Terror, and helped write even
those memos on interrogation techniques and the Geneva Conventions that appeared over Jay Bybee’s
signature. See Savage, supra note 114, at 79; The Torture Papers, supra note 9, at 3, 38, 218. Even the
Margolis Memo explaining the decision not to pursue disciplinary action against professor Yoo called
that memo “decidedly one-sided and conclusory.” Margolis Memo, supra note 90, at 45.
118. See generally Shane, supra note 3.
119. Id. at 158–67; Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1741, 1744 (2009).
120. See James Carney & John F. Dickerson, Inside the Mind of the CEO President, Time (Jul. 28, 2002),

http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,331981,00.html.

121. See Interview by Brit Hume with the President and Former President Bush, D.C. (Fox News broadcast

Jan. 11, 2009), 2009 WL 57564, at *1 (“I’m going to miss being the Commander-in-Chief of the
military. Earlier the past week I had the honor of having a military parade that said goodbye to the
Commander-in-Chief and it was an emotional moment for me and Laura.”).

122. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
123. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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hardly associated with either smaller government or libertarian values. Yet, accepting
the President as our national CEO seemingly drapes the President in the imagined
virtues of the private sector. The metaphor also helps excuse the President’s resistance
to being accountable to anyone but his base; CEO’s, after all, are ultimately beholden
to their shareholders. When someone like former U.N. ambassador John Bolton says,
“The President has a responsibility to be true to the people who voted for
him . . . . Otherwise, what’s the point of having elections?”124 he is utterly mistaking
marketplace accountability for a President’s fiduciary accountability to the nation as
a whole.
Jack Goldsmith, in his memoir of public service during the Bush administration,
bemoans that administration’s presidentialist dogmatism, but states: “It is not right to
say, as some have done, that [Vice President Cheney and his chief of staff, David
Addington] took advantage of the 9/11 attacks to implement a radical pro-President
agenda.”125 With respect, I think history will point to a different conclusion.126
Indeed, the Bush-Cheney success in just that agenda, which exploited 9/11
shamelesslessly, may now well make it appear politically perilous to pursue a different
conception with any vigor. Unless such an effort is made, however, no clear alternative
narrative of the presidency is going to become available—either to those who wield
executive power or to those who would hold our Presidents accountable.
V. CONCLUSION

In mid-February 2011, when popular protests erupted in Libya against the
autocratic rule of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, Qadhafi answered with violence,
opening fire on unarmed crowds.127 There followed a series of retaliatory diplomatic
responses, involving the United States, the United Nations, the African Union, and
other nations and international bodies.128 When Qadhafi intensified his campaign of
violent suppression, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, demanding
an immediate ceasefire in Libya and authorizing member states to engage in the use
of all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians.129 Two days later, the United
States commenced military operations to enforce Resolution 1973, launching strikes
against Qadhafi’s air defense systems and military airfields in order to lay the
124. Interview by Jon Stewart with John Bolton, The Daily Show (Comedy Central television broadcast Mar.

20, 2007), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue‑march‑20‑2007/john‑bolton.

125. Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 89.
126. See generally Savage, supra note 114.
127. David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Qaddafi Forces Violently Quell Capital Protest, N.Y. Times, Feb.

26, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/africa/26libya.html.

128. See Memorandum Op. from Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen. (Apr. 1,

2011), 2011 WL 1459998, at *1–3 [hereinafter OLC Libya Opinion], http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/
authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.
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groundwork for a no-fly zone over Libya.130 On March 21, 2011, President Obama
formally reported these events to congressional leadership “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” (WPR).131 Although the President did not cite the section of the
WPR to which he was referring, it was presumably section 4, which through the
operation of subsection 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress within
forty-eight hours “in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced
[without a prior declaration of war]—into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”132 On
April 1, 2011, the Justice Department’s OLC issued an opinion memorializing its
advice that the President had acted within his constitutional authority to undertake
such a military initiative without explicit congressional authorization.133 It based this
conclusion on the weightiness of the U.S. national interests involved and the
contextual facts indicating that the military’s efforts would be “limited in their
nature, scope, and duration.”134 OLC explicitly cited the WPR as implicitly
recognizing presidential authority of this scope.135
From the standpoint of separation of powers law and practice, these events seem
wholly conventional. Section 5(b) of the WPR, however, requires the President—
within sixty days of his report to Congress—to withdraw armed forces from any
engagement in which he was required to report under section 4(a)(1).136 The sixtyday rule would be inapplicable only if Congress had—since the President’s
report—explicitly authorized the President’s continuing action, or “if the President
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued
use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such
forces.”137 In the latter case, the WPR gives the President up to thirty additional days
to withdraw.138 The administration’s legal posture went from conventional to totally
obscure when the sixty-day limit—which ran on May 20, 2011—came and went
without any further report to Congress, any request for or grant of explicit authority,
or any certification that the President needed an additional thirty days to effectuate
a safe withdrawal. The only articulation of the administration’s legal position came
130. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives & the President Pro Tempore

of the Senate (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/
letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya.
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from White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, who said on May 20, “We believe the
President has acted in a way that’s consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”139
Matters thus stood until, under congressional pressure, the White House released
a report140 on June 15, 2011, with the heading, “United States Activities in Libya.”141
That report—which bears no letterhead, no date, and no signature—offers a oneparagraph conclusory statement of the administration’s position on applying the
sixty-day rule to its Libya campaign:
Given the important U.S. interests served by U.S. military operations in
Libya and the limited nature, scope and duration of the anticipated actions,
the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited
military operations abroad. The President is of the view that the current U.S.
military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers Resolution
and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because
U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated
by the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision. U.S. forces are playing a
constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition, whose operations
are both legitimated by and limited to the terms of a United Nations Security
Council Resolution that authorizes the use of force solely to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a
no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not involve sustained
fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the
presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or
any significant chance of escalation into a conf lict characterized by those
factors.142

In other words, the administration deems section 5 of the WPR inapplicable
because—given a series of what seem to be seven or eight limiting factors (none
singled out as weightier or more critical than the others)—the campaign that the
United States launched on March 19, 2011, was transformed into something less
than “hostilities” before the expiration of sixty days.
	There is, as it happens, no authoritative source of interpretation that provides an
irrefutable analysis confirming or rebuffing the administration’s interpretation of
“hostilities.” It ought to be observed, however, that, compared to earlier instances in
which Presidents urged what might be called the “sub-hostilities theory,” the Libya

139. Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
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campaign is offensive, sustained, and continuous.143 Moreover, U.S. military personnel
continued flying sorties over Libya even after the transfer of command responsibility
to NATO.144 There is an obviously steep uphill climb for any legal argument that
U.S. military involvement in the ongoing use of lethal force against an adversary who
did not attack the United States falls short of what the WPR calls “hostilities.”
What is just as confounding as the administration’s legal argument, however, is
its overall management of the legal issues. Although getting congressional support
for a joint resolution in support of Resolution 1973 might have proved challenging, it
probably could have been accomplished had the President sought such a resolution at
the time of his initial report to Congress. If the administration wanted to argue that
the April 4 transition of military operations to NATO ended U.S. involvement in
“hostilities”—as the word is used in the WPR—it should have said so on April 4. It
should certainly have said so prior to the May 20 expiration of the sixty days that
passed after the President’s initial report to Congress. Instead, without even the
cover of congressional appropriations to ratify the Libyan engagement, the President
found himself, as of mid-June 2011, still resting his Libyan initiative entirely on
inherent constitutional power to unilaterally undertake military operations “limited
in nature, scope, and duration.” This seems fairly problematic given that the NATO
mandate, as of this writing, has already been extended to September 30, 2011,145 at
which point the project will have lasted more than six months. Libya 2011, for war
powers purposes, is not Grenada 1983.146
	As America’s global military strategy begins to rely ever more heavily on
unmanned drones, off-shore missiles, and perhaps other remotely deployed weapons
systems, there is reason to fear that the Libya episode could live on as a precedent
very substantially undermining executive accountability to Congress for military
action. As this essay goes to press, it appears as if the administration has simply
squandered an obvious opportunity to combine a humanitarian mission abroad with
a compelling new narrative on the role of the presidency—a narrative based on rule
of law, checks and balances, and genuine public accountability. This would have only
required going to Congress. The narrative I am imagining might variously be called,
“the Checks and Balances Presidency,” “the Constitutionalist Presidency,” “the
Accountable Presidency,” “the Rule of Law Presidency,” or perhaps simply, “the
Democratic Presidency.” I like “democratic” the best because it captures the ideals of
143. Jack Goldsmith, Problems with the Obama Administration’s War Powers Resolution Theory, Lawfare (June
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presidential accountability to law as embodied in our Constitution or as enacted by
Congress through our democratic legislative process and of day-to-day presidential
accountability to attend to the interests of all of the American people, not just an
electoral base.
In elaborating on that ideal, President Obama would do well to go back to his
own words of May 2009 and give them clearer—and repeated—specification:
We uphold our most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but
because it strengthens our country and it keeps us safe. Time and again, our
values have been our best national security asset—in war and peace; in times
of ease and in eras of upheaval . . . .

[Regarding Guantánamo,] [t]he courts have spoken . . . . I cannot ignore
these rulings because as President, I too am bound by the law. The United
States is a nation of laws and so we must abide by these rulings . . . .
I ran for President promising transparency, and I meant what I said. And
that’s why, whenever possible, my administration will make all information
available to the American people so that they can make informed judgments
and hold us accountable . . . . Whenever we cannot release certain information
to the public for valid national security reasons, I will insist that there is
oversight of my actions by Congress or by the courts . . . .
We seek the strongest and most sustainable legal framework for addressing
[national security] issues in the long term—not to serve immediate politics,
but to do what’s right over the long term. By doing that we can leave behind a
legacy that outlasts my administration, my presidency, that endures for the
next President and the President after that—a legacy that protects the
American people and enjoys a broad legitimacy at home and abroad.147

There is nothing impractical about this view of the presidency, but for such a view to
endure as a potent counter-narrative to Bush-Cheney presidentialism, the Obama
administration must consistently test its actions according to these standards—and
either defend its actions within a Democratic Presidency framework or revise those
actions in deference to the rule of law and the system of accountability on which our
nation depends. That project would truly do honor to the memory of September 11.

147. Obama Nat’l Sec. Remarks, supra note 7.
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